In most OECD countries the gap between rich and poor has widened over the past decades. This paper analyzes whether and to what extent taxes and social transfers have contributed to this trend. Has the redistributive power of different social programs changed over time? The paper contributes to the literature by disentangling several parts of fiscal redistribution in a comparative setting. We use micro-data from the Luxembourg Income Study to examine household market inequality, redistribution from transfers and taxes, and the underlying social programs that drive the changes, for 20 countries from the mid-1980s to mid-2000s. The contribution of each program is estimated using a sequential accounting budget incidence decomposition technique. The aim of this paper is to offer detailed information on the redistributive impact of social transfer programs. We focus on changes in fiscal redistribution of 13 different social programs and taxes. We observe a sizeable increase in primary household inequality in all 20 countries over the last 25 years (except Ireland). In most countries, the extent of redistribution has increased too. Tax-benefit systems have offset two-third of the average increase in primary income inequality, although they appear to have become less effective in doing so since the mid-1990s. We find that the public old age pensions and the survivors scheme attribute 60 percent to the increase of redistribution during the period 1985-2005 for a subset of countries considered (with full tax/benefit information). Social assistance accounts for 20 percent, and the benefits for sickness, disease, and disability account for around 13 percent of the total increase in redistribution. Other transfers (invalid career benefits, education benefits, child care cash benefits and other child and family benefits) account for 22 percent of the total increase in redistribution. On the contrary, taxes slowed down redistribution by 17 percent during 1985-2005. 
Introduction
Two OECD studies Growing Unequal? (2008) and Divided We Stand (2011) show that in most countries income inequality rose and the extent of redistribution by public cash transfers and income taxes and social security contribution has increased too over the period mid 1980s -mid 2000s as a whole. The tax-benefit system has offset rising market income inequality to some extent, but not fully. This paper contributes to the literature by disentangling several parts of fiscal redistribution in a comparative setting.
To what extent has the redistributive power of different social programs changed over time?
The overall tendency over the past two or three decades has been for an increase in income inequality in the large majority of rich nations. 1 In OECD countries, the widening of the income distribution has been mainly driven by greater inequality in market income from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. Market income inequality also rose from the mid1990s to the mid-2000s, but at a slower pace (OECD, 2008 and 2011) . Several explanations of income inequality have been introduced by comparative researchers in sociology, economics, and political science. 2 One of the main driving forces behind disposable income distribution is the reduction of inequality through the tax-transfer system. 3 The overall redistributive effect can be divided into redistribution by transfers and by taxes, or even into more details. 4 In the mid-2000s, the average redistributive effect achieved by public cash transfers is twice as large as that achieved through household taxes, although for example the United States stands out for achieving a greater part of redistribution by taxes (OECD, 2008 and 2011; Whiteford, 2010, Wang and Caminada, 2011; and Wang et al, 2012) . As the tax and transfer system was only able to offset a part of this rise in market income inequality over the last 25 years, disposable income (i.e. after taxes and social benefits) has also become more unequal in many countries.
This paper examines changes in the redistributive effects of taxation and income transfers to households in detail. Former, extensive literature on "welfare state retrenchment" that has emerged over the last decades seems to imply that welfare states have become less redistributive. Recent studies and data, to the contrary, show that most welfare states became more redistributive in the 1980s and 1990s (see also Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005) . Welfare states have not compensated completely for the rise in inequality of market income among households, but most have done so to some degree. By and large, welfare states have worked the way they were designed to work. It is markets, not redistribution policies, that have become more inegalitarian. It should be noted here that because tax-benefit system are generally progressive, one could expect that higher market income inequality automatically leads to more redistribution, even without policy actions (Immervoll and Richardson, 2011) .
Under the circumstance of increasing income inequality and public expenditure cuts in the 1980s and 1990s, attention needs to be paid to the design of welfare states. How good is the tax-benefit system as a whole and its programs in narrowing income distribution?
What is the trend of redistribution over time?
In a recent study, Immervoll and Richardson (also published in OECD, 2011) examine the impact of tax and transfer systems on income inequality in the past 25 years across countries. They find that in most countries tax-benefit policies offset some of the large increases in market income inequality, although they appear to have become less effective at doing so since the mid-1990s. Until the mid-1990s, tax-benefit systems in many LIS countries offset more than half of the rise in market income inequality.
However, while market income inequality continued to rise after the mid-1990s, the redistributive effect of taxes and benefits on household income inequality declined. As a result, tax-benefit systems are now less effective at reducing inequality compared to the mid-1990s. After the mid-1990s, reduced redistribution has been the main driver of widening income gaps. However, the analysis of Immervoll and Richardson (2011) does not cover the total population, but is restricted to the working-age population. They exclude the largest government transfer program, public pensions. Especially this program has a strong redistributive impact ( Wang et al, 2012) This paper elaborates on the work of Immervoll and Richardson (2011) and on Jesuit and Mahler (2004 and 2006) . Jesuit and Mahler divide government redistribution into several components: the redistributive effects from unemployment benefits, pensions, and taxes, and performed an empirical exercise for 13 countries with LIS-data around the years 1999/2000. Their study provided relatively new insights. However, the data used are not very recent, the number of countries is rather small and only two specific social programs are included in the analysis. Moreover, their analysis was restricted to one moment in time (around 1999) . In this paper we will make further steps on these points.
In our paper we compute the changes in the redistributive effects of different social programs and taxes over time among the total population. This is meant as an extension of previous work (Wang and Caminada, 2011; and Wang et al, 2012) . At the program level, we examine the redistributional trends of sickness benefits, disability benefits, state old age and survivors benefits, child/family benefits, unemployment compensation benefits, social assistance cash benefits, other social insurance benefits, mandatory payroll taxes and income taxes. We use the data from Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and analyze the tax-benefit distributional effects across 20 LIS countries from the mid1980s to the mid-2000s. The redistributive effect of each program is measured sequentially using a budget incidence approach. Our contribution to the literature is that we provide trends of the redistribution across countries at program level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides our research method and data.
Section 3 presents the results of a cross country comparison. In section 4 we decompose total redistribution through the tax-benefit system into the redistributive effects of 11 social transfers and several taxes from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s in a comparative setting. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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Research method

Data from Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)
The growing interest in national and cross-national differences in earnings and income inequality (over time) has produced a wide range of studies (see Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Brandolini and Smeeding, 2007; OECD, 2008 and 2011; Lambert et al, 2010 and Richardson, 2011 ). An important development has been the launching of LIS in which micro datasets from various countries have been "harmonised". 5 Consequently it is possible to study income inequality across countries, and over time (see Atkinson et al, 1995) . LIS micro data seems to be the best available data for describing how income inequality and the redistributive effects of taxes and transfers vary across countries, and over time (Nolan and Marx, 2009; Smeeding, 2008) .
There exist several detailed national studies of redistribution trends. International comparisons tend to focus on specific parts of the tax-benefit system. Multi-country comparative studies that consider the entire tax-benefit system are rare (Immervoll and Richardson, 2011) . Point-in-time comparisons are sometimes thought problematic since large institutional differences between countries, notably in terms of the balance between public and private provision or cash transfers versus benefits in-kind, make it difficult to interpret country differences in terms of a particular portion of the redistribution system.
However, this is less of an issue when we focus on comparing changes across countries, as overall institutional setups (as well as measurement choices in the underlying data) tend to vary less over time than they do cross-nationally.
From nearly 300 variables in the LIS dataset, we choose those related to household income (all kinds of income sources), total number of persons in a household and household weight (in order to correct sample bias or non-sampling errors) to measure income inequality and redistribution across countries. In line with LIS convention and the work of Mahler and Jesuit (2006) , we have eliminated observations with zero or a missing value of disposable income from LIS data. We use the Gini coefficient as an overall measure of income inequality. 6 Household weights are applied for the calculation of Gini coefficients, the equivalence scale is the square root of the number of household members (LIS' equivalence scale). Another measurement decision made in this paper concerns top and bottom coding. We bottom code datasets at 1 per cent of equivalized mean income and top code at 10 times the median of non-equivalized income for the nation sample (cf. Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997:661) . This procedure limits the effect of extreme values at either end of the income distribution.
5 See survey information LIS at http://www.lisdatacenter.org/. 6 It could be argued that the Gini coefficient is rather sensitive to the middle part of the income distribution compared to other indicators. E.g. Atkinson's index (α=1.0) and Mean Log Deviation are relatively more sensitive to the changes in the lower tail of the income distribution. For this reason, we did a sensitivity analysis for several global indicators of income inequality; see Annex A. All indicators follow the same pattern at one moment in time (for different countries) with the largest redistribution given by Mean Log Deviation and the lowest redistribution given by the Atkinson's index (α=0.5). In most cases the empirical results on redistribution do not alter using a specific global income inequality indicator. However, especially if a social program is targeted towards a certain group, for instance to the lower tail of the income distribution, the result vary slightly, depending on the indicators used.
Measuring the redistributive effects of taxes and social transfers
Usually, the impact of social policy on income inequality is calculated in line with the work of Musgrave, Case and Leonard (1974) , i.e. statutory or budget incidence analysis. A standard analysis of the redistributive effect of taxes and income transfers is to compare pre-tax-transfer income inequality and post-tax-transfer income inequality (OECD 2011: 268) . Our measure of the redistributive impact of social security on inequality is straightforwardly based on formulas developed by Kakwani (1986) and Ringen (1991) :
Redistribution by taxes and social transfers = primary income inequality − disposable income inequality
This formula is used to estimate the reduction in inequality produced by taxes and social transfers, where primary income inequality is given by a summary statistic of pre-tax, pre-transfer incomes and disposable income inequality is given by the same summary statistic of disposable equivalent incomes. When calculating inequality indices for both primary and disposable income, people are ranked by their primary and disposable incomes respectively, so that the re-ranking effect is included in our results (see Plotnick, 1984 ; the same method is applied by Richardson, 2011 and Caminada, 2011) . Table 1 presents the framework for accounting income inequality and redistribution through various income sources. Source: Wang and Caminada (2011) The budget incidence analysis is not without problems; see a critical survey of efforts to measure budget incidence by Smolensky et al (1987) . The pre-transfer inequality is compared to the post-transfer inequality keeping all other things equal -namely, -6 -assuming unchanged household and labor market structures, thus disregarding any possible behavioral changes that the situation of absence of social transfers would involve (Frick et al, 2000; Palme, 1996) . However, behavioral responses may obviously be important. It is likely that in the absence of social transfers more people will work (more) thereby earning higher incomes. Kim (2000b) showed that both the generosity and efficiency of the tax/transfer system may influence the level of pre-tax-transfer income inequality. Budget incidence calculations can therefore only be seen as an approximation of the redistributive effects because the assumption that agents behave similar in situations with and without social transfers and social security. This implies that estimates for redistribution through taxes and transfers should be regarded as upper bounds. Despite this problem, analyses on statutory and budget incidence can be found for decades in literature on public finance.
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It should be noted that our analysis captures, but does not isolate the direct effect of policy reforms. Showing the direct effects of policy reforms on measured redistribution requires holding everything else constant. A way to identify the relative contribution of policy changes and automatic effects of trends in market income inequality on redistribution would be to calculate tax burdens and benefit entitlements for representative samples of households for different periods. Unfortunately, such an analysis is currently not feasible for a larger group of countries as the required microsimulation models are not readily available (OECD, 2011: 288-289) .
With respect to the inequality measure we use the Gini coefficient. The change in the Gini between pre-and post-government income reflects redistribution through taxes and transfers. The Gini coefficient of equivalized disposable household income is often used as a summary measure of income distribution. The Gini coefficient lies between 0 (no inequality) and 1 (maximum inequality).
We sequentially decompose the Gini coefficient in order to calculate the partial redistributive impact of transfers and taxes; see Wang and Caminada (2011) for details.
The results obtained for the specific transfers and taxes are corrected for the ordering effect.
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The sequential accounting decomposition approach has been, among others, advocated by Kakwani (1986) and is also followed by Mahler and Jesuit (2004) and Mahler and Jesuit (2006) , Immervoll et al (2005) and Whiteford (2008) . Other techniques of the decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income source can be found in the literature as well; see e.g. Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) , Stark et al (1986) , Kim (2000a) . In the literature two techniques of decomposing inequality are distinguished; the sequential accounting decomposition and the factor source decomposition approach. When comparing both approaches, they lead to the same estimates of disposable income 7 See for example Musgrave and Tun Thin (1948) , Gillespie (1965) , Kakwani (1977) , Reynolds and Smolenskey (1977) , Mitchell (1991 ) and OECD (2008 . 8 The ordering of programs has influence on the results when using the sequential accounting decomposition method. The partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) when computed as the first (last) social program. We corrected for this effect as follows. We consider every specific social transfer as the first program to be added to primary income and every direct tax as the first tax to be subtracted from gross income. In that case, the sum of all partial redistributive effects amounts to (a little) over 100 percent. So we rescaled the redistributive effects of each program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall redistribution (100%) divided by the sum of all partial redistributive effects of all programs (a little over 100%).
inequality, but to contradictory results with respect to the importance of benefits for redistributing income (see Fuest et al, 2010) . Inequality analysis based on the sequential accounting decomposition approach (as applied in this paper) suggests that benefits are the most important factor in reducing inequality in the majority of countries. The factor source decomposition approach, initiated by Shorrocks (1982) , however, suggests that benefits play a much smaller role, while taxes and social contributions are more important contributors to income inequality reduction. Fuest et al (2010) explain these partly contradictory results. The most important difference between the two approaches is that the accounting approach applies tax benefit instruments sequentially, whereas the decomposition approach accounts for them simultaneously. See also Kammer et al (2012) . We follow the sequential decomposition approach, which fits in a strand of empirical literature, among which the recent OECD-work.
Measuring change over time
In line with Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005) , we believe that it is more informative to measure changes in inequality in absolute terms (the ending value minus the beginning value) rather than in percentage terms (absolute change divided by the beginning value).
This issue arises as well when we compare redistribution at any given point in time. We adopt an absolutist approach by measuring absolute change in inequality.
Absolute measures of change may be easier to interpret than relative measures. For example, suppose that taxation and transfers reduce inequality by the same amount in two countries that have different distributions of market income. When the change is measured in relative terms, we observe a larger reduction of inequality in the country with the more equal distribution of market incomes. "Do we really want to say that the welfare state in the country with the more egalitarian distribution of market income is more redistributive?" (Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005: 450) . These problems with relative measures are especially complex when we compare changes over time in redistribution, since the relative measure becomes "percentage change in percentage change." It is straightforward to measure redistribution as the absolute difference between inequality before and after taxes and transfers, and to measure change in redistribution as the difference in these amounts between two points in time.
Focus on total population -including public pension schemes
This paper extends and deepens the analyses of both Immervoll and Richardson (2011) and Wang et al (2011) , using the tax-benefit models across countries over time to show the combined redistributive effects of taxes and transfer systems. It attempts to gauge the effects of several taxes and benefits over a longer time period and for as many countries as data permit.
Unlike most existing studies, it explicitly focuses on the total population, and not to the non-elderly population (those aged 15-64). 9 Indeed, restricting the analysis to the nonelderly would avoid some of the problems inherent to comparisons of incomes between 9 Tony Atkinson gave some helpful comments on the choice of different age groups. He supported our idea to take the total population into account (LIS Summer Workshop 2012 It should be noted that our results could be biased by the focus on the total population instead of non-elderly population (those aged 15-64). Income redistribution among the total population is higher compared to the redistribution within the working-age population. However, the correlation between inequality (and redistribution) of total population and inequality (and redistribution) of working-age population is rather high;
see Figure 1 . Figure 1 (panel a) plots Gini coefficients of primary income and disposable incomes for both population groups; panel (b) plots figures for redistribution for both population groups. This suggests that focusing on the total population will not give a strong bias. Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011) , and own calculations
Country selection
In empirical studies, the selection of countries and data-years differ due to the consideration of data quality and data availability. We apply a cross-national analysis using comparable income surveys for most countries in the LIS data base. LIS data contains information for 36 countries for one or more data years (from wave 0 to wave VI), allowing researchers to make comparisons in a straightforward manner, and the information is still updating and expanding. This paper uses the data of 20 LIS countries, with at least three data points (around 1985, 1995 and 2005) . 11 We distinguish two groups of countries (based on data quality): 11 Namely Australia (1985, 1995, 2005) , Belgium (1985 Belgium ( , 1995 Belgium ( , 2000 , Canada (1987 Canada ( , 1994 Canada ( , 2004 , Denmark (1987 Denmark ( , 1995 Denmark ( , 2004 , Finland (1987 Finland ( , 1995 Finland ( , 2004 , France (1981 France ( , 1994 France ( , 2005 , Germany (1984 , 1994 ), Ireland (1987 ), Israel (1986 , Italy (1986 ( ), Luxembourg (1985 ( , 1994 , Mexico (1984 Mexico ( , 1996 Mexico ( , 2004 , the Netherlands (1983 Netherlands ( , 1994 Netherlands ( , 2004 , Norway (1986 Norway ( , 1995 Norway ( , 2004 , Poland (1986 Poland ( , 1995 Poland ( , 2004 , Spain (1980 Spain ( , 1995 Spain ( , 2004 , Sweden (1987 Sweden ( , 1995 Sweden ( , 2005 , Switzerland (1982, 1992, 2004) , the United Kingdom (1986, 1995, 2004) , and the United States (1986, 1994, 2004) . 12 In line with Immervoll and Richardson (2011), we do not take Taiwan into consideration.
Empirical results
Trends in the distribution of primary and disposable income in LIS countries
This section reviews the evidence on cross national comparisons of primary and Table 2 shows the 20 country-average trend of primary income and disposable income inequality from 1985 to 2005. This figure highlights some significant differences across periods in a general way. On average, income inequality increased markedly. This increase was stronger during the first decade. The widening of income gaps was driven by rising inequality in the distribution of primary income, which was partly offset by public cash transfers and households taxes. In the second decade, the rising of primary income inequality and disposable income inequality are in parallel.
OECD (2011: 268-271) has indicated that market incomes of non-elderly people have become more unequal in most countries. Table 2 shows inequality trends for primary incomes (including any private transfers) and disposable incomes (primary incomes plus cash benefits minus income taxes) for the total population and confirm most, but not all findings of OECD (2011). Using the data reported in Table 2 , averaging across countries, it can be shown that inequality of primary income has increased by 13% over a twentyyear period across the countries shown. This is a substantial increase over a relatively short period of time.
-11 - Primary-income inequality has been the main driver of inequality trends in disposable incomes, but did redistribution policies have a substantial effect as well? Between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s, redistribution systems compensated two-third of the increase in primary-income inequality. The upwards trend in primary-income inequality continued after the mid-1990s, although at a lower rate. In absolute terms, redistribution increased across countries. Over the two decades as a whole, primary-income inequality rose by about 0.054, while redistribution rose 0.036. Taxes and transfers now reduce inequality by about 35%; more than in the mid-1980s (31%).
Country-specific results are also presented in Table 2 . Tax-benefit systems in Belgium 13 ,
Finland, Germany, Poland and Sweden achieve the greatest reduction in inequality, lowering the Gini value by 20 points or more in the mid-2000s, while the smallest redistributive effect is seen in Mexico, the United States and Canada (less than 12 points).
Through the entire period, disposable income inequality became significantly larger in Belgium, Finland and Israel, whereas it decreased in Denmark, France, Ireland, Spain and
Switzerland. In the period 1985-1995, higher disposable income inequality was mainly 'caused' by higher primary income inequality (although primary income inequality declined in Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland). In this period, government redistribution has offset the widening of income gaps through public cash transfers and household taxes either in full (e.g. Canada, Denmark, France and Germany) or in part (in all others; see Figure 2 ).
Cross-country variance is larger since the mid-1990s. Primary income inequality In contrast to the results in Immervoll and Richardson (2011; also published in OECD, 2011), we do not confirm their finding that tax-benefit policies have become less effective in redistribution since the mid-1990s when the total population (instead of the workingage population) is taken into consideration. Among the total population both primary income inequality and redistribution continued to rise after the mid-1990s; we do not find that the fiscal redistribution effect of taxes and benefits on household income inequality stabilized (or declined). As a result, among the total population tax-benefit systems in the mid-2000s are even more effective at reducing inequality compared to the mid-1990s.
So, the claim that reduced redistribution is a main driver of widening income gaps since 13 Belgium (2000) seems to be an outliner. We have noticed that there are many zeros of net wages and salaries in the dataset.
the mid-1990's must be toned down. Moreover, our finding is a stimulus to analyze several programs (parts) of the redistribution system in more detail. Table 3 summarizes the results of Immervoll and Richardson (2011) for trends in the redistribution among the working-age population and our findings for the total population for 12 countries with full tax and benefit information for mid-1980s, mid-1990s and mid2000s. Source: Immervoll and Richardson (2011) and Wang and Caminada (2011) In contrast to Immervoll and Richardson (2011) Table 4 highlights that the trend of overall redistribution is mainly caused by transfers.
Redistributive effects of taxes and transfers over time
From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, total redistribution increased, driven by the stronger redistributive effect of transfers. In the decade from the mid-1990s to the mid2000s, no change was observed in overall redistribution in the first five years, followed country. In all countries, total redistribution was mainly driven by transfer redistribution.
The redistribution achieved by public cash transfers was more than twice as large as that achieved through taxes, except for Canada, Israel, and the United States. Redistribution achieved by the tax system fell in all countries but rose in Canada, Denmark, Finland and the United States.
From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s the patterns of redistribution across countries are more diverse, both in overall redistribution and in tax and transfers redistribution. In this decade, total redistribution fell in many countries but increased significantly in Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in Ireland and Norway. The trends of transfer redistribution across countries followed the total redistribution pattern. However in Ireland and Luxembourg, the decrease of transfer redistribution did not lead to a decreasing total redistributive effect, because of the rising redistribution through the tax system in those countries. See figure 2. 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011) , and own calculations Note: For 12 countries full tax and benefit information is available in LIS. For other 8 countries (marked italic) net wages and salaries are used because gross variables are not available for all data years in LIS.
Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011) , and own calculations
Program size and targeting of transfers
Considering the redistributive effect of social benefits, a distinction can be made between programs' size and the extent to which benefits are targeted toward low-income groups by means-testing. In a seminal paper by Korpi and Palme (1998: 663) , they have posited a "paradox of redistribution" whereby "the more we target benefits to the poor . . . the less likely we are to reduce poverty and inequality." The paradox arises from the fact that highly targeted programs have the support of a small and isolated political base. As they put it, targeted programs offer "no rational base for a coalition between those above and below the poverty line. In effect, the poverty line splits the working class and tends to generate coalitions between better-off workers and the middle class against the lower sections of the working class" (Korpi and Palme, 1998: 663) . Comprehensive programs, on the other hand, even when they are organized according to social insurance principles, tend to encourage coalitions between the working and middle classes that leave low income groups less isolated. With this background in mind, it is useful to explore empirically these two aspects of transfers with reference to the LIS database. Is redistribution associated with transfers' overall size or with their target efficiency? Is there, as is often suggested, a tradeoff between the two? Using LIS micro data it is possible to calculate a measure of the average value of social transfers as a percentage of households' pre-tax income: the larger the value, the greater the share of total income that is derived from transfers. It is also possible to calculate a summary index of the degree to which transfers are targeted toward low-income groups. This is done by applying Kakwani's (1986) Table 5 for around 1985 and around 2005. 
Decomposition of the redistributive effect of social transfers and taxes across LIS countries from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s
How have the redistributive effects of the different parts of welfare states altered over time and across countries? This section shows trends of detailed redistributive effects across a selection of those 12 LIS countries with full information on taxes and benefits. We elaborate on the work of Mahler and Jesuit (2006) , Immervoll and Richardson (2011) and OECD (2011). However, we refine their approach (see Caminada, 2011 and Wang et al, 2012) , decomposing the trajectory of the Gini coefficient from primary to disposable income inequality in several parts: we will distinguish 11 different social benefits, income taxes and social contributions in our empirical investigation. We calculate the following (partial) redistributive effects over time, based on the LIS household income components list: sickness benefits, occupational injury and disease benefits, disability benefits, state old-age and survivors benefits, child/family benefits, unemployment compensation benefits, maternity and other family leave benefits, military/veterans/war benefits, other social insurance benefits, social assistance cash benefits, near-cash benefits, mandatory payroll taxes and income taxes. As explained before, we consider state old-age pension benefits as part of our analysis, because they are part of the safety net and generate significant reduction in poverty and income inequality. Occupational and private pensions are not taken into account.
To illustrate the idea of decomposition from primary to disposable income inequality, Table 6 reports the trends of redistributive effects of the different parts of tax-benefit system averaged for 12 LIS countries from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s. 14 14 It should be noted that our results are hardly affected by the ordering effect. The partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) when computed as the first (last) social program. A sensitivity analysis shows that changing the order of adding a specific benefit to primary a Short-term occupational injury and disease benefits, Long-term occupational injury and disease benefits; Occupational injury and disease benefits. b Disability pensions; Disability allowances; Disability benefits. c Universal old-age pensions; Employment-related old-age pensions; Old-age pensions for public sector employees; Old-age pensions.; Early retirement benefits; Survivors pensions; State old-age and survivors benefits. d Child allowances; Advance maintenance; Orphans allowances; Child/family benefits. e Unemployment insurance benefits; (Re)training allowances; Placement/resettlement benefits; Unemployment compensation benefits. f Wage replacement; Birth grants; Child care leave benefits; Maternity and other family leave benefits. g Invalid career benefits; Education benefits; Child care cash benefits; Other social insurance benefits. h General social assistance benefits; Old-age and disability assistance benefits; Unemployment assistance benefits; Parents assistance benefits; Social assistance cash benefits. i Near-cash food benefits; Near-cash housing benefits; Near-cash medical benefits; Near-cash heating benefits; Near-cash education benefits; Near-cash child care benefits; Near-cash benefits. j Mandatory contributions for self-employment; Mandatory employee contributions.
Note: 12-country-average; Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Source: own calculations based on LIS income (or subtracting tax from gross income) does change the partial effect of this transfer (or tax) in total redistribution only slightly. In case we consider a specific social transfer as the last (instead of the first) program to be added to primary income distribution, the computed partial redistributive effect changes up to 1%-point at the highest. In the decade from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the dominant pattern was that of more redistribution. This was especially evident for state old age and survivors benefits (T4), to a lesser extent for disability benefits (T3), child and family benefits (T5), unemployment compensation benefits (T6), social assistance cash benefits (T10) and near cash benefits (T11). Less redistribution was generated by occupational jury and disease benefits (T2), mandatory payroll taxes (T12) and income taxes (T13). In this decade overall redistribution increased by 0.017 point for our 12-country-average.
In the second decade between 1995 and 2005, redistribution as a whole was rather stable. We observe a moderate decline for child / family benefits (T5), unemployment compensation benefits (T6), military / veterans / war benefits, other social insurance benefits, near cash benefits (T11), mandatory payroll taxes (T12) and income taxes (T13). However, redistribution increased in this period rather strongly for state old age and survivors benefits (T4), and to a lesser extent for sickness benefits (T1), occupational injury and disease benefits (T2), disability benefits (T3), maternity and other family leave benefits (T7) and social assistance cash benefits (T10). The average change in total redistribution during this decade was only 0.006 point.
Over the entire period 1985-2005, there was more diversity in patterns. A significant increase of redistribution can be attributed to disability benefits (T3) and the state old age and survivors benefits (T4), whereas less redistribution comes via occupational jury and disease benefits (T2), mandatory payroll taxes (T12) and income taxes (T13). The cumulative change in total redistribution during the entire period was of around 0.024 points.
With respect to trends in the redistributive effects of several social programs across countries, the results are diverse. Source: own calculations based on LIS
Conclusion
Different welfare systems and different social policies lead to various outcomes in changes of income inequality. This paper investigates income distribution and redistribution attributed to social transfers and taxes across 20 LIS countries from around 1985 to the mid-2000s, based on the micro household income data from LIS. We have provided trends of primary and disposable income inequality, overall and disaggregated redistributions by social programs in a comparative way, across much more countries than that have been studied before, offering an accurate, detailed picture of redistribution of incomes through taxes and transfers across social welfare states.
We have applied a sequential budget incidence analysis and find that the welfare states on average reduce inequality by one third around 2005. Social benefits have a much stronger redistributive impact than taxes. As far as social programs are concerned, public pensions account for the largest reduction in income inequality, although the pattern is diverse across countries. To a lesser extent, social assistance, disability and family benefits also contribute to smaller income disparities.
We observe a sizeable increase in primary household inequality in all 20 countries over the last 25 years with the exception of Ireland. In most countries, the extent of redistribution has increased as a whole too. Tax-benefit systems offset two-third of the increase in primary income inequality, although they appear to have become less effective in doing so since the mid-1990s.
Our approach differs from earlier studies in that the total population is taken into consideration, in stead of the working-age population only. In contrast to the results in OECD (2011) and Immervoll and Richardson (2011) , we do not find that tax-benefit policies have become less effective in redistribution since the mid-1990s. Among the total population both primary income inequality and redistribution continued to rise after the mid-1990s; we do not find that the fiscal redistribution effect of taxes and benefits on household income inequality stabilized (or declined). As a result, the tax-benefit systems in the mid-2000s are even more effective at reducing inequality compared to the mid1990s. So, the claim that reduced redistribution is a main driver of widening income gaps since the mid-1990's must be toned down.
We find that within rising overall redistribution, the public old age pensions and the survivors scheme attribute 60 percent to the increase of redistribution during the entire period 1985-2005. Social assistance accounts for 20 percent, and the benefits for sickness, occupational injury and disease, and disability account for around 13 percent of the total increase in redistribution among our 12-country-average. Other transfers (invalid career benefits, education benefits, child care cash benefits and other child and family benefits) account for 22 percent of the total increase in redistribution. On the contrary, taxes slowed down redistribution by 17 percent during 1985-2005. This empirical analysis does not show why benefits and taxes have become more or less redistributive. It can be expected that, as market income inequality rises, the tax-benefit systems will automatically have a more redistributive impact, because of the progressivity built into these systems. But also policy chances will certainly explain a part of the changes in redistribution. Future research should shed some light on the impact of specific policy reforms in changing the redistributive effect of welfare states. This sensitivity analysis is presented in three dimensions. The first dimension is the redistributive effect across countries at one moment in time, which is shown in Figure A1 .
It presents the level of redistribution in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the o Other transfers (child/family benefits, maternity and other family leave benefits, military/veterans/war benefits, other social insurance benefits); and o Taxes (income taxes and mandatory payroll taxes).
15 Among others, see Atkinson et al (2000) , Föster (2000) , Hauser and Becker (1999) and Lambert (1993) . Note: For 12 countries full tax and benefit information is available in LIS. For other 8 countries (marked italic) net wages and salaries are used because gross variables are not available for all data years in LIS.
